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## WASHINGTON FRONT

## A Look at Intelligence

## Mansfield Expected to Lead Drive For Closer Supervision of Agency

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CPYRGHT

Washington—There is certain to be some hue and cry when the new Congress convenes for a shakedown of the American Intelligence system.

Such outcries have been heard before and have never amounted to much. This one promises to be more substantial, for two reasons. First, because this government was apparently caught unprepared by the momentous developments of the last month in eastern Europe and the Middle East, and, second, because the current demand for a close look at our hush-hush espionage activities has more formidable backing than similar proposals have ever had before.



Roth

The chief spokesman for a new deal in Intelligence is Senator Mike Mansfield, Democrat of Montana. Mansfield, who is slated to become the majority whip in the Senate, is respected in both parties as an alert and intelligent Senator who has not allowed partisanship to cloud his judgment and who has been a consistently strong supporter of bipartisan foreign policy.

As a hard-working member of the Foreign Relations Committee, in close and frequent touch with both State Department and Central Intelligence Agency officials, Mansfield is better informed on what is going on in the world than most of his colleagues.

## 'Caught by Surprise'

When he asserts, as he did recently, that "we were caught short—we were caught by surprise in Poland, caught by surprise in Hungary, caught by surprise in the Middle East," his words carry considerable weight. And when he says that the time has come to consider creating a "watch-dog" congressional committee to supervise the functioning of the Central Intelligence Agency, he is apt to be listened to.

It may be correct to say that we were "caught short" by the Israeli invasion of Egypt—in the sense that we were not prepared with an effective and consistent policy for meeting that crisis.

But it is not true that we were caught completely by surprise. The White House was informed of the Israeli mobilization almost as soon as it began, and knew 24 hours before it was launched that the strike was to be against Egypt.

The White House also had 24 hours warning from intelligence sources of the Franco-British move into Egypt in conjunction with the Israeli attack.

It can be argued that 24 hours' notice isn't much when events of such proportion are being dealt with, but it can also be argued that it is better than nothing.

In that connection it should be remembered that Intelligence operated under some handicap not of its own making.

One of these handicaps was the breakdown of the close liaison that once existed between ourselves and our principal allies. It has been well publicized, and it is true that Britain and France did not inform this country of their intention to go into Egypt. Such a situation would have been unthinkable in the days when the heads of government were operating on a close personal basis, as when Roosevelt and Churchill, or even Truman and Attlee, were in power.

It would also have been expected in the not too distant past that whenever a government planned a major move of importance to us we would get a tipoff from some neutral power that got wind of it.

The fact is that, in the Middle East situation, Britain and France planned their move at least two weeks in advance but we got no hint of it, from them or anyone else.

## Contact Was Lost

The onus for that lies, if it lies anywhere, not on Intelligence but on the State Department and the Executive.

Our diplomacy is no longer conducted on a personal basis. It may well be that the way we now operate is better in the long run, that more solid foundations for peace can be laid by relying on negotiation through the United Nations than on the personal understandings of heads of states. But our new method demonstrably involves some loss of contact with other governments. That is a price we may be willing to pay, but it should not be charged against Intelligence, or at least not against Intelligence alone.

The intelligence problem in eastern Europe was different from that in the Middle East. The CIA was long aware that trouble was brewing in Poland and Hungary and that it was only a question of time when the lid would blow off.

But it did not know when, or in which country the crisis would come first, or what form it would take when it did. As a result, the Intelligence Service was unable to provide the Administration with a firm estimate of the situation and the Administration was similarly unprepared to deal with the circumstances that did develop. There was, apparently, no intelligence information on how Russia would react when the satellites began throwing off their shackles.

It is, of course, easier to detect defects in Intelligence in the light of hindsight than to suggest how a better result might have been achieved. Mansfield and some other members of Congress feel that the fault lies partly in the fact that the CIA has been permitted to function as a law unto itself, free of the congressional restraints on budget, personnel and general operations that serve to keep most administrative agencies in line.